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Abstract
This paper proposes a comparative analysis of the federal funds rate. The analysis is 
based on the results of an empirical study, conducted using the econometrics of Vector 
Auto Regressions. The results are compared across two time periods: 1960-1979 and 
1983-2002, the intervals representing the pre and post-Volcker monetary eras. The 
study examines the degree of exogeneity of the federal funds rate and its power to 
explain and predict variations in macroeconomic aggregates. The paper concludes that 
for the post-Volcker era the federal funds rate has become more exogenous; that the 
federal funds rate has remained a strong economic indicator; that the notion of “lean 
against the wind” monetary policy continues to be relevant and appropriate; that the 
“price effect” of the response of inflation to innovations in the federal funds rate has 
become smaller. The paper also suggests that the Federal Reserve has since the 1980s
initiated the practice of countercyclical monetary policy, and that economic cycles have 
tightened during the post-Volcker era.
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Introduction
The initial incentive to undertake this research work comes from the 1992 paper by 
Bernanke and Blinder: “The Federal Funds Rate and the Channels of Monetary 
Transmission”. This paper was an important one, as it carries a lot of information useful for 
future research, for reflection on standard economic theory, and for the practical matters of 
central banking.
Bernanke and Blinder are using the econometric tool of basic Vector Auto Regressions for 
the majority of their analysis. The models that are directly relevant to this paper consist of 
two systems, one with and the other without the M2 money supply indicator. Both systems 
contain the federal funds rate as the main target of analysis, inflation and unemployment as 
the macroeconomic aggregates. The basic ideas were to establish a connection between 
the funds rate and the two real-economy variables – inflation and unemployment, and to 
determine if the funds rate, among other potential economic indicators like M2 or the 
treasury bills rate, had a stronger connection. The paper had the 1959-1979 period, or the 
pre-Volcker era, as the time interval. The primary focuses of attention were the forecast 
error variance decompositions tables and the graphs of impulse response functions. 
This paper aims to extend the analysis of Bernanke and Blinder to the post-Volcker era, or 
to the period of after 1982. In addition, I will add other economic variables to the 
discussion, such as Gross Domestic Product and the output gap (the differential between 
the actual real GDP and the potential real GDP). Overall I am pursuing a two-dimensional 
goal with this work: to perform a comparative analysis of the pre-Volcker and post-Volcker 
eras to supplement the earlier study by Bernanke and Blinder, and to examine the reactions 
of the models when GDP and the output gap are inserted. For the latter part, a comparison 
of the two periods will also be presented.
It is important to mention that the paper by Bernanke and Blinder had several agendas, 
covered a variety of topics, and included more variables in the core analysis. I am mostly 
interested in the behavior of the federal funds rate in particular, and such aspects as the 
interest rate spread will not be examined.
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The primary research questions of this paper are on the overall effectiveness of monetary 
policy during the post-1982 period. I will specifically address the following questions. First, 
how does the federal funds rate respond to unexpected shocks to unemployment and
inflation, and also to GDP and output gap innovations? Second, how has the strength of the 
federal funds rate as an economic indicator developed since the 60s and 70? Third, are 
there any fundamental or structural changes in the relationships between the funds rate 
and the macroeconomic aggregates in the post-Volcker era as opposed to the 1959-1979 
period? And if there are some evident changes, what are the potential causes for such 
differences?
One of the secondary reasons for undertaking this work is to see if and how the historical 
developments of the early 80s affected the behavior of the federal funds rate in relation to 
the real economy. At least 3 major potential catalysts are possible: the deregulation of the 
financial sector in the 1980s, a structural shift in inflation dynamics in the late 1970s, and 
an elevated public sensitivity to inflation (thus a more fragile inflation expectations 
component). All these factors could have potentially influenced the conduct of monetary 
policy; the vise-versa relationship is also possible. Therefore it’s important to expand the 
analysis of the federal funds rate to the most recent years.
Apart from the several historical facts that could have had an exogenous impact on the 
monetary policy strategizing and/or on the funds rate-macroeconomy interplay, a more 
simple motivation for this study is that a more recent dataset is necessary. The Bernanke 
paper deals with old data, and a more contemporary set of figures is desirable. The period 
of 1983-2002 is therefore appropriate for a comparative analysis of the two studies, as well 
as for the refreshment of the data.
Methods
This paper is based on an extensive empirical study. The software application used for the 
econometric analysis is STATA. The data for this study was drawn mostly from the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED) online database. The information source is credible and is 
considered to be one of the most reliable online sources of economic and statistical 
information for the US market. There are 6 major variables that are used in this paper. First 
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– the federal funds rate – is the FRED’s “effective federal funds rate”. Second –
unemployment – is the FRED’s “civilian unemployment rate” and is denominated in 
percentages. Third – inflation – the FRED’s “consumer price index”, denominated in 
percentage changes from previous year. Fourth – M2 – the FRED’s “M2” indicator for the 
monetary base. Fifth – GDP – is the FRED’s “Real Gross Domestic Product”, denominated in 
percentage changes from previous year. Sixth – GAP – is the syndicated variable 
representing the output gap: the actual real GDP less the potential real GDP shown as a 
percentage of the potential real GDP. Finally, there are two time dimensions: each is set 
monthly, the first from January 1983 to December 2002, the second from January 1960 to
December 1979. Both dimensions are equal in length: 19 full calendar years. All the above
economic variables are also recorded as month-based.
For this paper I will be employing the econometrics of basic vector autoregressions (VAR). 
VARs are time series models that use only past values of the variables of interest to make 
forecasts. For instance, a four-variable VAR system of federal funds interest rates, M2, 
unemployment, and inflation can be expressed as:
Rt=β1 + ∑Rt-i + ∑Mt-i + ∑Ut-i + ∑πt-i + εRt
Mt=β2 + ∑Rt-i + ∑Mt-i + ∑Ut-i + ∑πt-i + εMt
Ut=β3 + ∑Rt-i + ∑Mt-i + ∑Ut-i + ∑πt-i + εUt
πt=β4 + ∑Rt-i + ∑Mt-i + ∑Ut-i + ∑πt-i + εIt
Where R, M, U, and π are the federal funds interest rate, M2, unemployment rate, and 
inflation rate respectively. β is an intercept term, t is a time subscript, and ε is an error 
term. Thus, each of the three variables is expressed as a linear function of past values of 
itself and past values of other variables in the system. Unemployment is substitutable by 
the GDP and the output gap, and considering that there are 2 time intervals, this leads to 6 
VAR systems: with unemployment pre and post-Volcker, with GDP pre and post-Volcker, 
and with the output gap pre and post-Volcker. The funds rate, M2, and inflation remain in 
all 6 models.
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As a quick theoretical note, the estimated error terms from each equation above are 
correlated so that it is not correct to assume that, for instance, εUt represents an 
independent surprise movement in the unemployment rate. To better interpret the dynamic 
relationships present in the data, the residuals from the VAR are broken up into linear 
combinations of independent (orthogonal) shocks. A common orthogonalization is to 
assume that the VAR system is recursive so that there is a chain of causality among 
surprises in the variables during any given period. The transformation of the original shocks 
into recursive, orthogonal shocks is called the Choleski decomposition. Choleski 
decomposition will be used in this paper for all forecasting purposes such as the impulse 
response functions.
After running the basic VAR, I will conduct the following tests and post-VAR analytics. First 
of all, the marginal significance levels of exclusion will be presented. Those are the tests to 
decide whether, for example, inflation and/or unemployment can be rejected from the 
model. Also, it helps to see if the lagged values of certain variables help predict the other 
variables; that would happen if lags of, for instance, the funds rate are statistically 
significant and thus carry some predictive powers. In total, there will be 6 lags of each 
variable. In addition, the Granger-Causality test results will be shown. The Granger test
establishes “Granger-causality”, if any, for the pairs of our variables. 
The core analytical segment of this paper will include the Forecast Error Variance 
Decomposition (FEVD) tables and the Impulse Response Functions (IRF). The FEVD 
technique essentially creates arbitrary forecasts in the future variations of a particular 
variable, and decomposes that variance into influences attributable to the shocks of other 
variables in the system. The FEVD are based on Choleski decomposition.
The IRFs are depicting responses of certain variables to the impulses (unexpected shocks) 
of other variables in the VAR system. The IRFs in this study will be orthogonolized. The 
forecast horizon for the FEVDs and the IRFs is 36 periods, which in our case are months.
Results will be shown in the 6/12/24/36 months format.
The results of each econometric technique will be discussed independently as well as 
collectively in the end of the paper. Conclusions and observations will be compared across 
periods. Essentially, the whole set of tests is performed twice – once for the 1960-1979, the 
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other for the 1983-2002 period. Primarily, the FEVD and the IRF results will be compared. 
Should there be any noteworthy differences, those will be noted, and potential explanations 
for those differences will be proposed. It is important to mention that the period that I 
identify as “pre-Volcker” differs from the time interval used in the Bernanke and Blinder 
study: mine is 1960-1979 and Bernanke’s was 1959-1979. Therefore, there are some minor 
discrepancies in the two sets of results.
Analysis and Development
Exclusion Tests
I begin the presentation of results by briefly describing the exclusion statistics of the 6
variables in the VARs. Tables of results will be presented in pairs to highlight the differences 
across time. Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix A depict the marginal significance levels of 
exclusion for the first VAR: funds rate, M2, unemployment, inflation.
Three things must be noted about this table. First, the significance levels of the lags of 
unemployment and inflation in the Funds Rate equation (yellow highlight) indicate that they 
are doing a worse job in predicting the funds rate for the 1983-2002 period than for 1960-
1979. Thus, our first observation is that the funds rate is potentially more independent and 
exogenous in the post-Volcker era.
Second, the funds rate is showing some early signs of predicting the movements in the 
values of unemployment and inflation, as depicted by the lags of fundsrate in the 
unemployment and inflation equations (green highlight). Interestingly, for the pre-Volcker 
era, the funds rate is better at predicting inflation than for the post-Volcker era. With 
regards to unemployment, the results are yet inconclusive; both periods suggest some 
predictive presense. Further testing will build on this early observation of the strength of 
the funds rate’s predictive ability.
Third, M2 is very evidently losing its predictive powers for unemployment as proven by the 
M2 lags in the unemployment equations. With regards to inflation, M2 is stable over the two 
periods. However, on both variables, the funds rate is consistently outperforming M2. This 
is in parallel with the earlier findings of Bernanke and Blinder in 1992. Thus, while the
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federal funds rate is not a perfect indicator of macroeconomic aggregates, it is consistently 
more efficient than its best alternative, M2, for both pre and post-Volcker periods.
The chi-squared test results are also reported in Appendix A.
For our second model, with the output gap instead of unemployment, the tables 3 and 4 
report the corresponding exclusion test statistics for the two time periods in the same 
Appendix A.
The potential pattern of federal funds rate’s growing exogeneity with time is getting 
stronger. As displayed in the tables (yellow highlight), the funds rate is considerably more 
independent from the influences of the output gap and inflation in the post-Volcker era.
It’s interesting that the relationship between the federal funds rate and the output gap has 
remained basically unchanged over the span of almost 40 years (green highlight). Also 
noticeable is the fact that M2 is probably more suitable at explaining the output gap than 
even the funds rate itself (blue highlight). It is apparent that unemployment is not the only 
possible variable which can be used as a “proxy” for the real economic growth element. It is 
possible that the output gap could be a more realistic approximation, and any conclusions 
with regards to the funds rate being a more efficient economic indicator than M2, those 
reached by Bernanke and Blinder in 1992, could be questioned.
For the final pair of models, with the GDP variable, the appropriate tables are numbers 5 
and 6 in Appendix A. The funds rate exogeneity pattern discovered earlier is now solid and 
consistent across 4 macroeconomic aggregates: unemployment, inflation, output gap, and 
now GDP as well. The proposition that funds rate is more exogenous in the post-Volcker is 
now noted and will be tested later in the paper using the FEVDs and IRFs.
Similarly to the model with the output gap, the funds rate is not particularly significant at 
any lag of the GDP function. But it’s important to point out that both for the funds rate and 
the GDP the first lag is deviating from the rest lags by being a lot more sensitive: in the first 
lag, GDP is much more significant in the funds rate’s function than in any other lag, and the 
same relationship holds for the funds rate function.
With regards to the predictive powers of M2, it is once again evident that M2 is better at 
describing a macroeconomic variable (blue highlight), in this case GDP, than the funds rate. 
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However, because the federal funds rate is so much more significant in the lags of 
unemployment, any conclusions about the predictive abilities of the two indicators at this 
stage of the research would be premature. It is probable that more sophisticated 
forecasting techniques will show which of the two variables is stronger.
Granger-Causality Tests
Interesting implications arise from the Granger-causality test. First of all, for the first VAR 
with unemployment, regarding the argument for federal funds rate exogeneity, the yellow 
highlight in Tables 1 and 2 of Appendix B suggests that none of the variables taken 
together Granger-cause the funds rate in post-Volcker era, which further builds on the 
proposition that the funds rate is indeed becoming more independent. In contrast, during 
the 1960-1979 period, the funds rate was almost perfectly endogenous according to this 
particular VAR model. Also, none of the variables taken individually Granger-causes the 
federal funds rate in the post-Volcker era.
Second, in both time periods, unemployment is Granger-caused by the federal funds rate. 
The inflation part is a weaker, as shown by the green highlight. M2 is strongly Granger-
causing inflation in the post-Volcker era. This is consistent with the earlier observations 
from the exclusion statistics: the funds rate is excellent at predicting unemployment but 
weak with inflation, while M2 tends to be more appropriate for inflation in the post-Volcker 
era. In both periods, however, M2 has no power over unemployment.
For the second VAR with the output gap, the general picture is practically the same. The 
federal funds rate, endogenous in the pre-Volcker era is strictly exogenous in the 1983-
2002 period. The funds rate is strongly Granger-causing the output gap in the post-Volcker 
era, which is similar to the unemployment relationship. The funds rate is again poor at 
connecting with inflation, while M2 is again Granger-causing inflation in the post-Volcker 
era.
The situation is slightly different for the third VAR with GDP. While the federal funds rate is 
again more exogenous in the post-Volcker era, and M2 is still Granger-causing inflation 
while the funds rate isn’t, GDP doesn’t seem to be responding to the funds rate the way the 
output gap does. 
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Overall, all three VARs have shown that M2 is Granger-causing inflation, and that the funds 
rate is more exogenous in the post-Volcker era. Also, the funds rate Granger-causes 
unemployment and the output gap, but not the GDP. The conclusions of the Granger tests 
are thus a bit inconclusive about the funds rate being a consistently good policy indicator.
Forecast Error Variance Decompositions
The FEVDs will be presented with specific purpose, to provide evidence for the particular 
argument in discussion. Overall, there are 3 specific aspects that must be analyzed, and the 
FEVD tables will be fitting this structure. The first part is on the federal funds rate 
exogeneity. Second – the funds rate as an indicator of variations in macroeconomic 
variables. Thirdly, there will be a comparison between pre and post-Volcker eras.
First, we examine the notion of federal funds rate exogeneity. The suiting FEVD would be 
the one consisting of the funds rate as a response and four macroeconomic variables 
(unemployment, inflation, output gap, GDP) as the impulses. Table 1 in Appendix C first 
presents the results for the pre-Volcker era. Every single variable for almost every forecast 
horizon is in double-digit percentages. This clearly shows that the funds rate was an 
endogenous variable during the 1960-1979 period.
Table 2 presents the same FEVD picture but for the post-Volcker era. The contrast in 
numbers is simply remarkable, because now only inflation has some significant influence on 
the funds rate for the horizons 24 and 36. While almost all others are in low single-digits. 
The proposition that the funds rate has been exogenous since the Volcker tenure at the Fed 
is becoming less of a hypothesis and more as an undisputable empirical fact.
The second notion to be analyzed is the predictive power of the federal funds rate: the 
percentage of forecasted variation in the 4 macroeconomic variables that the funds rate is 
able to predict. Tables 3 and 4 in Appendix C show the relevant results. While there is no 
obvious pattern which was in the case with post-Volcker funds rate exogeneity, it is clear 
that the funds rate has some evident explanatory potential for each of the four variables, 
and for both time periods. There are 3 distinct observations to point out about this second 
set of FEVDs.
First, and this is useful for practical purposes of modern central banking, post-Volcker 
shocks to the federal funds rate explain 40% of forecasted variation in unemployment after 
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12 months (Table 4, yellow highlight). While the percentages were also high for pre-
Volcker, those numbers never reached as high as in the 1983-2002 period.
This observation becomes even more interesting when one looks at the same Table 3, the 
same forecast horizon of 12 months, but at the GDP column (green highlight). The 
percentage of explained variation for GDP is also maximized for the 12-month’s horizon. 
Again, while the strength of the federal funds rate’s explanatory power is also evident in 
pre-Volcker as well, the numbers form a noticeable pattern in the post-Volcker table, with 
clear maximums and hints of some underlying business cycle. The point on business cycles
will be brought up again in later parts of the paper.
The third point is on a structural change in inflation prediction between the two periods: 
one can notice the uniformally stable percentages for the inflation column in the pre-Volcker 
table (Table 3), and a different pattern of gradually rising and peaking numbers in Table 4 
(blue highlight). It is possible that this observation, if taken together with the first point on 
unemployment and GDP, can signify an underlying shift in the macroeconomic landscape 
with the start of Volcker’s tenure.
All in all, the FEVDs have reinstated the argument for the federal funds rate exogeneity, 
shown that the funds rate is a good indicator of all four macroeconomic variables, and 
suggested a possible structural shift in the inflation dynamics that might have occurred in 
the 80s. 
Impulse Response Functions
The same structure that was already established in the previous paragraphs will remain a 
key guide for this part as well. The IRFs were constructed based on two primary principles: 
federal funds rate exogeneity, and the funds rate as policy indicator. 
The first part is represented by the first set of IRFs, where the funds rate is the response 
variable, and the four macroeconomic variables play the roles of the impulses. The idea is 
to illustrate visually the reactions of the federal funds rate to unexpected innovations 
coming from the real economy.
The second part, on the other hand, is built on the IRFs where the federal funds rate is an 
impulse, and the four economic variables are the responses. These IRFs help demonstrate 
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the dynamics of individual as well collective reactions of the variables to sudden movements 
of the funds rate.
In addition, all IRFs portray both post-Volcker and pre-Volcker functions to add an 
illustrative comparative element to the whole analysis. As a rule, straight lines represent the 
1983-2002 functions, and dashed lines – 1960-1979 functions.
Figures 1, 2, and 3 in Appendix D all represent the first VAR model with unemployment. 
Figure 3 is particularly interesting, since it draws a parallel between this study and the work 
by Bernanke and Blinder. Essentially, the dashed lines on this graph are the reproduced 
version of the 1992’s paper, and the two straight lines present the evidence from the post-
Volcker era. Since Bernanke and Blinder put a lot of emphasis on this particular angle of 
analysis: with unemployment and inflation, this graph carries a lot of weight for 
comparative economic literature. Three important points, some already mentioned and 
discussed in 1992, must be noted about this graph.
First, as shown in the said Figure 3 of Appendix D, a positive innovation to the pre-Volcker 
inflation or unemployment would lead to a jump and fall in the funds rate respectively. A 
positive relationship between the funds rate and inflation, and a negative relationship 
between the funds rate and unemployment is perfectly consistent with what Bernanke and 
Blinder already discussed in 1992. The so-called “lead against the wind” monetary policy is 
clearly visible on this graph; the funds rate rises for any positive inflation innovation both 
pre and post-Volcker (although more reluctantly in the latter case), and falls for any 
unexpected spike in unemployment. This suggests that, fundamentally, the overall 
monetary strategy of the Fed has not changed dramatically in the past several decades. 
It is interesting that for the 1960-1979 period the funds rate would stay low in response to 
an unemployment shock for very extended periods of time. On the other hand, in the post-
Volcker era, most certainly because of Volcker’s influence in the first place, the funds rate 
returns to its original level approximately 24 months after the shock. This is actually 
consistent with an earlier observation from the FEVD tables, the one about potential 
business cycle tightening and structural economic shifts.
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Second, the amplitudes of the lines for the two periods are different. In other words, the 
funds rate seems to be much more prone to excessive fluctuation in the post-Volcker era, 
particularly in the first 15 months after an economic shock. This is witnessed by the fact 
that the straight lines are much closer to the x-axis than the dashed lines.
Figures 4 and 5 reproduce the IRFs with the output gap instead of unemployment. Again 
supporting the argument for post-Volcker federal funds rate exogeneity, the funds rate is 
practically irresponsive to an unexpected positive shock to the output gap, while the 
response is stronger for the 1960-1979 period.
Figure 6, graph of the IRF with GDP, tells a similar story. This is only natural because the 
output gap is only a syndicated variable of the GDP. Both variables experience same 
shocks: a rise in GDP, assuming a constant real potential GDP component, automatically 
implies an increase in the output gap. For the GDP IRF, the lines are practically parallel to 
the x-axis and are barely detached from it.
Figure 8 is a graph of the combined VAR, with all four economic variables simultaneously
influencing the federal funds rate. Several conclusions have been reached from this first set 
of IRFs. First, “lean against the wind” monetary theory is still a relevant idea and is 
empirically traceable. Second, the graphs of the post-Volcker lines are systematically closer 
to the x-axis, suggesting a higher degree of non-responsiveness and thus exogeneity of the 
federal funds rate. Third, there are again signs of structural differences between the two 
periods with regards to funds rate-inflation dynamics, witnessed by graphs 3 and 8.
The second set of IRFs represents the reversed relationships: now the federal funds rate is 
an impulse to which the economic variables respond. We start again with the first VAR with 
unemployment. Similarly to the previous set, figures 9, 10, 11 of Appendix D are again in 
parallel with the graphs of Bernanke and Blinder. The 1960-1979 component is essentially a 
reproduction of their work, while the 1983-2002 is the new addition of this paper.
Figure 11 is similar in its composition to figure 3, except that the impulses and responses 
have switched. In response to a positive innovation to the federal funds rate, 
unemployment rises, while inflation falls. There are several very interesting points to be 
discussed here. 
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First of all, “lean against the wind” is again traceable from this graph. In other words, in the 
long-run, inflation is driven down by a positive funds rate innovation, and unemployment 
begins to rise after several months. While this is perfectly consistent with economic logic 
and the “lean against the wind” theory, however, there are significant considerations that 
could potentially cast doubt on the federal funds rate as a policy indicator.
The fact that unemployment experiences a short fall after a positive funds rate shock is 
intuitive. Unemployment is laggy and requires time to adjust to exogenous economic 
shocks. It therefore takes time for unemployment and economic growth as such to 
negatively react to a monetary contraction. Assuming, of course, that a positive funds rate 
innovation can be considered as a monetary contraction. With inflation, the situation is 
slightly more complicated. Inflation spikes up with an unexpected increase in the federal 
funds rate. Although it eventually moves downwards, the initial spike is the so-called “price 
effect”. This price effect is exactly the reason why there are some questions over the 
stability of the funds rate as a policy indicator.
Now, the intriguing part is that the positive jump in inflation in response to a positive funds 
rate innovation is true for both periods. Bernanke and Blinder had the same presence of the 
price effect in their findings. However, for the post-Volcker era the price effect is clearly 
smaller: consider the time interval between when the price effect starts (inflation rises) and 
when it ends (inflation starts to fall), and compare that interval between the two periods. 
For 1960-1979 the price effect interval is approximately 20 months, while for the post-
Volcker 1983-2002 the interval is almost halved to 10 months.
The criticism of the whole funds rate forecasting technique is soothed by the fact that the 
price effect, which questions the rigidity of the funds rate as an economic indicator, is much 
smaller in the post-Volcker era. It therefore follows that the funds rate can and should be 
considered a strong measure for predicting and explaining economic variation, especially for 
the post-1983 period.
Figures 12, 13 and Figures 14, 15 representing the VARs with the output gap and GDP 
respectively will be discussed together. Special focus is on the figures 13 and 15 which 
portray the output and GDP with inflation. On both graphs, there is a dramatic change in 
the behavior of the real economy variable – output gap and GDP – across the two time 
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periods. In response to a positive innovation in the federal funds rate, the output gap on 
graph 13 drops for the 1960-1979 period. The same logic naturally applies to graph 15 with 
GDP. However, for the post-Volcker 1983-2002 period the relationship is exactly reversed, 
as both the output gap and the GDP increase in response to a positive shock to the funds 
rate.
There clearly appear to be more fundamental reasons to such transformed dynamics; and 
not only of the output gap and GDP but also of inflation – the observation mentioned 
several times in this paper. It is evident that the clue to this shift lies in early 80s, the time 
when Paul Volcker took control of the Federal Reserve. It’s therefore important to look into 
some historical facts.
Consider below the FRED’s graph of consumer price index movement (our proxy for 
inflation) in the past 50 years. The blue line shows the highly volatile behavior of inflation in 
the late 60s and 70s. However, as witnessed by the red line, since the 80s inflation has 
been following a more stable course with much narrower bounds of fluctuation. Essentially 
we are observing a structural shift in inflation dynamics in the 1980s, a fact which carries 
important information for this paper’s federal funds rate analysis.
There is at least one plausible explanation that could provide an economic rationale for the 
above phenomena. Highly unstable, inflation of before 1980, was managed primarily pro-
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cyclically. In other words, the Federal Reserve would wait for the prices to actually start 
rising to launch any sort of contractionary measure.
For the post-1982, the situation is fundamentally different. First of all, the public is now 
apparently much more inflation-aware. Consistently rising prices, or even worse, 
inconsistent inflation expectations create a terrible investment atmosphere. The Fed now 
begins a counter-cyclical approach towards controlling inflation. The Fed is itself more 
inflation aware, in the sense that it predicts rising prices and adjusts the monetary base and 
the federal funds rate in order to anticipate an inflation spike. This is why, in an earlier IRF,
the straight line of the inflation response to the funds rate impulses has a smaller amplitude
in the post-Volcker era (Figure 11).
Impulses are by definition “innovations”, or unexpected movements in the variable. Since 
the 80s, there haven’t been many unexpected shocks to the funds rate; all of its 
movements were either minor and very short-term, or they represented the Fed’s deliberate 
and planned attempts to counteract future inflation. Inflation therefore does not any more
respond to unexpected funds rate movements, because there are no unexpected funds rate 
movements.
All in all, a more inflation-aware general public forced the governing central bank to become 
more inflation-aware itself, which resulted in a counter-cyclical inflation management tactic. 
A more careful, deliberate strategy caused a structural shift in inflation dynamics, which is 
demonstrated on the FRED’s inflation graph above. Unexpected inflation movements 
become more short-term, very minor in size, and don’t require ad-hoc central bank 
involvement.
Simultaneously, this explains the reversed relationship between the funds rate and the 
GDP/output gap. Since economic growth walks parallel with long-run inflation, it is therefore 
plausible to suggest that a countercyclical inflation management strategy would also result
in a countercyclical relationship with the GDP and thus the output gap as well. Thus, when 
on figures 13 and 15 the output gap and the GDP decrease in response to a positive shock 
to the funds rate, it is possible that the Fed is actually contracting back a monetary 
expansion which it had already performed several periods before this shock. Keeping the 
lags of the GDP in mind, the Fed is expecting the economy to respond to the expansion that 
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it already performed a while ago. The Fed therefore starts to contract to prevent long-run 
inflation which would be caused by the funds rate being kept too low for too long.
Conclusions
First of all, the federal funds rate has become a much more exogenous monetary 
instrument in the post-Volcker era.
Second, it has been evident on several occasions that the federal funds rate is a good 
indicator of macroeconomic aggregates. The funds rate is far more efficient than the
alternative measure of M2 with regards to unemployment. However, M2 seems to be better 
at predicting inflation.
Third, the old notion of “lean against the wind” monetary policy holds true for the post-
Volcker era. The funds rate indeed responds negatively to positive innovations in 
unemployment, and rises for any increase in inflation. While the amplitudes and magnitudes 
of those relationships have diminished in the past several decades, and despite the “price 
effect” complications, it seems legitimate and logical to continue applying the “lean against 
the wind” story in economic literature.
Fourth, the beforementioned price effect has become considerably smaller in the past 
decades. Thus, the criticism of the funds rate’s predictive powers that is based on the said 
price effect is losing its grounds.
Fifth, on several occasions it was observed in this paper that the economic (or business) 
cycle has tightened in the 1983-2002 period. This notion comes from the empirical evidence 
that both the funds rate and the economic aggregates tend to recover from shocks quicker 
and return to their pre-shock equilibriums faster than in the 1960-1979 period. The 
question of economic cycles was never among the research questions of this paper. 
Perhaps future research could expand on this idea.
Finally, the impulse-response interplay between the funds rate, inflation, and the output 
gap/GDP has led to the discovery of a structural shift of the early 1980s in the whole 
inflation dynamics. The change is explained by the apparent introduction of countercyclical 
inflation management by the Volcker’s Federal Reserve. The extent to which the reader will 
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agree to such explanation is naturally uncertain. It is possible and very likely that someone 
will be able to provide better answers and more extensive explanations to the questions 
raised in the paper.
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Appendix A: Exclusion Tests
VAR1: Funds Rate, M2, Unemployment, Inflation
Marginal Significance levels of exclusion 
(1983-2002)
Equation Lags of
Fundsrate Funds Rate M2 Unemploym Infl
L1 0.000 0.779 0.085 0.610
L2 0.040 0.253 0.851 0.236
L3 0.439 0.501 0.421 0.535
L4 0.887 0.47 0.12 0.852
L5 0.282 0.096 0.96 0.203
L6 0.333 0.026 0.476 0.025
M2 Funds Rate M2 Unemploym Infl
L1 0.613 0.000 0.000 0.030
L2 0.129 0.456 0.034 0.890
L3 0.02 0.419 0.406 0.366
L4 0.429 0.006 0.513 0.75
L5 0.599 0.064 0.355 0.377
L6 0.973 0.484 0.073 0.125
Unemployment Funds Rate M2 Unemploym Infl
L1 0.059 0.849 0.000 0.001
L2 0.462 0.887 0.065 0.018
L3 0.144 0.572 0.179 0.593
L4 0.093 0.454 0.129 0.399
L5 0.491 0.186 0.39 0.957
L6 0.481 0.574 0.332 0.701
Inflation Funds Rate M2 Unemploym Infl
L1 0.279 0.155 0.650 0.000
L2 0.934 0.225 0.026 0.012
L3 0.33 0.04 0.563 0.806
L4 0.582 0.112 0.121 0.453
L5 0.99 1 0.782 0.036
L6 0.896 0.888 0.66 0.031
Chi-Squared
(1983-2002)
Equation χ2 (Chi-Squared)
P-
Value
Fundsrate 13478 0.00
M2 11802 0.00
Unemployment 13374 0.00
Inflation 4502 0.00
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Marginal Significance levels of exclusion
(1960-1979)
Equation Lags of
Fundsrate Funds Rate M2 Unemploym Infl
L1 0.000 0.485 0.044 0.006
L2 0.086 0.271 0.256 0.672
L3 0.067 0.515 0.852 0.77
L4 0.175 0.964 0.635 0.928
L5 0.62 0.553 0.462 0.575
L6 0.048 0.197 0.167 0.52
M2 Funds Rate M2 Unemploym Infl
L1 0.268 0.000 0.346 0.009
L2 0.887 0.000 0.228 0.349
L3 0.552 0.427 0.994 0.302
L4 0.902 0.992 0.493 0.799
L5 0.064 0.39 0.017 0.478
L6 0.011 0.181 0.138 0.234
Unemployment Funds Rate M2 Unemploym Infl
L1 0.071 0.123 0.000 0.031
L2 0.195 0.270 0.003 0.039
L3 0.045 0.943 0.171 0.603
L4 0.007 0.881 0.35 0.733
L5 0.429 0.295 0.551 0.524
L6 0.178 0.457 0.244 0.913
Inflation Funds Rate M2 Unemploym Infl
L1 0.182 0.355 0.809 0.000
L2 0.650 0.366 0.567 0.049
L3 0.688 0.387 0.84 0.017
L4 0.384 0.139 0.116 0.048
L5 0.271 0.047 0.678 0.323
L6 0.698 0.083 0.653 0.012
Chi-squared Tests
(1960-1979)
Equation χ2 (Chi-Sqaured)
P-
Value
Fundsrate 7466.58 0.00
M2 18651.54 0.00
Unemployment 9700.976 0.00
Inflation 19271.29 0.00
R. Jamilov The Federal Funds Rate in the post- Volcker Era 23
VAR 2: Funds Rate, M2, Output Gap, Inflation
Marginal Significance levels of exclusion
(1983-2002)
Equation Lags of
Fundsrate Funds Rate M2 GAP Infl
L1 0.000 0.470 0.529 0.976
L2 0.029 0.147 0.829 0.526
L3 0.55 0.518 0.923 0.789
L4 0.993 0.459 0.806 0.629
L5 0.422 0.159 0.333 0.226
L6 0.332 0.065 0.97 0.046
M2 Funds Rate M2 GAP Infl
L1 0.222 0 0.721 0.017
L2 0.398 0.741 0.234 0.513
L3 0.056 0.704 0.008 0.845
L4 0.312 0.005 0.12 0.677
L5 0.259 0.012 0.886 0.833
L6 0.606 0.163 0.971 0.273
Output Gap Funds Rate M2 GAP Infl
L1 0.958 0.352 0.000 0.134
L2 0.320 0.263 0.622 0.689
L3 0.75 0.654 0 0.057
L4 0.772 0.911 0 0.003
L5 0.441 0.507 0.987 0.025
L6 0.169 0.807 0.204 0.286
Inflation Funds Rate M2 GAP Infl
L1 0.146 0.063 0.628 0.000
L2 0.804 0.205 0.589 0.013
L3 0.413 0.064 0.56 0.905
L4 0.592 0.059 0.92 0.405
L5 0.925 0.72 0.693 0.067
L6 0.87 0.982 0.85 0.08
Chi-squared tests
(1983-2002)
Equation χ2 (Chi-Sqaured)
P-
Value
Fundsrate 12822 0.00
M2 11166 0.00
Output 
Gap 5385 0.00
Inflation 4270 0.00
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Marginal Significance levels of exclusion
(1960-1979)
Equation Lags of
Fundsrate Funds Rate M2 GAP Infl
L1 0.000 0.194 0.042 0.015
L2 0.079 0.890 0.935 0.595
L3 0.091 0.231 0.736 0.758
L4 0.283 0.739 0.286 0.871
L5 0.546 0.616 0.559 0.775
L6 0.066 0.362 0.699 0.448
M2 Funds Rate M2 GAP Infl
L1 0.287 0 0.832 0.010
L2 0.644 0 0.674 0.311
L3 0.663 0.812 0.015 0.257
L4 0.446 0.648 0.032 0.765
L5 0.062 0.456 0.86 0.24
L6 0.011 0.231 0.372 0.071
Output Gap Funds Rate M2 GAP Infl
L1 0.917 0.350 0.000 0.582
L2 0.555 0.613 0.950 0.898
L3 0.591 0.631 0.001 0.473
L4 0.535 0.423 0.006 0.366
L5 0.787 0.842 0.788 0.573
L6 0.957 0.389 0.96 0.509
Inflation Funds Rate M2 GAP Infl
L1 0.326 0.460 0.127 0.000
L2 0.913 0.307 0.943 0.027
L3 0.678 0.217 0.023 0.016
L4 0.219 0.121 0.648 0.063
L5 0.134 0.108 0.257 0.102
L6 0.35 0.277 0.04 0.002
Chi-squared tests
(1960-1979)
Equation χ2 (Chi-Sqaured)
P-
Value
Fundsrate 7725 0.00
M2 18882 0.00
Output 
Gap 3370 0.00
Inflation 20590 0.00
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VAR 3: Funds Rate, M2, GDP, Inflation
Marginal Significance levels of exclusion
(1983-2002)
Equation Lags of
Fundsrate Funds Rate M2 GDP Infl
L1 0.000 0.944 0.631 0.740
L2 0.016 0.424 0.519 0.437
L3 0.628 0.594 0.639 0.601
L4 0.912 0.473 0.549 0.879
L5 0.528 0.194 0.826 0.379
L6 0.312 0.132 0.448 0.054
M2 Funds Rate M2 GDP Infl
L1 0.326 0 0.268 0.036
L2 0.348 0.573 0.846 0.584
L3 0.098 0.678 0.079 0.907
L4 0.382 0.012 0.355 0.789
L5 0.342 0.008 0.161 0.445
L6 0.804 0.204 0.028 0.132
GDP Funds Rate M2 GDP Infl
L1 0.285 0.014 0.000 0.000
L2 0.716 0.009 0.186 0.170
L3 0.488 0.094 0 0.411
L4 0.616 0.918 0 0.021
L5 0.902 0.005 0.313 0.06
L6 0.605 0.137 0.193 0.731
Inflation Funds Rate M2 GDP Infl
L1 0.363 0.075 0.706 0.000
L2 0.964 0.140 0.499 0.012
L3 0.288 0.067 0.263 0.711
L4 0.582 0.076 0.907 0.613
L5 0.851 0.552 0.663 0.159
L6 0.835 0.744 0.269 0.153
Chi-Squared tests
(1983-2002)
Equation χ2 (Chi-Sqaured)
P-
Value
Fundsrate 12779 0.00
M2 11415 0.00
GDP 2101 0.00
Inflation 4352 0.00
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Marginal Significance levels of exclusion
(1960-1979)
Equation Lags of
Fundsrate Funds Rate M2 GDP Infl
L1 0.000 0.376 0.140 0.024
L2 0.055 0.143 0.868 0.613
L3 0.059 0.272 0.629 0.617
L4 0.333 0.769 0.984 0.771
L5 0.57 0.615 0.49 0.575
L6 0.08 0.441 0.684 0.651
M2 Funds Rate M2 GDP Infl
L1 0.227 0 0.683 0.022
L2 0.742 0 0.654 0.607
L3 0.752 0.992 0.101 0.16
L4 0.986 0.682 0.115 0.892
L5 0.103 0.434 0.407 0.248
L6 0.036 0.249 0.252 0.06
GDP Funds Rate M2 GDP Infl
L1 0.644 0.024 0.000 0.649
L2 0.774 0.023 0.610 0.329
L3 0.21 0.449 0.081 0.056
L4 0.405 0.571 0.005 0.947
L5 0.215 0.891 0.872 0.733
L6 0.91 0.525 0.839 0.33
Inflation Funds Rate M2 GDP Infl
L1 0.283 0.744 0.001 0.000
L2 0.750 0.289 0.128 0.026
L3 0.594 0.147 0.006 0.001
L4 0.168 0.189 0.489 0.008
L5 0.429 0.264 0.644 0.068
L6 0.864 0.644 0.112 0
Chi-Squared tests
(1960-1979)
Equation χ2 (Chi-Sqaured)
P-
Value
Fundsrate 7221 0.00
M2 18359 0.00
GDP 1751 0.00
Inflation 22661 0.00
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Appendix B: Granger-Causality Tests
VAR 1: Funds rate, M2, Unemployment, Inflation
Granger causality test
(1983-2002)
Equation Excluded Prob>chi2
Fundsrate M2 0.269
Fundsrate Unemployment 0.113
Fundsrate Inflation 0.225
Fundsrate ALL 0.127
M2 Fundsrate 0.000
M2 Unemployment 0.002
M2 Inflation 0.000
M2 ALL 0.000
Unemployment Fundsrate 0.001
Unemployment M2 0.404
Unemployment Inflation 0.000
Unemployment ALL 0.000
Inflation Fundsrate 0.803
Inflation M2 0.022
Inflation Unemployment 0.276
Inflation ALL 0.007
Granger causality test
(1960-1979)
Equation Excluded Prob>chi2
Fundsrate M2 0.293
Fundsrate Unemployment 0.108
Fundsrate Inflation 0.009
Fundsrate ALL 0.004
M2 Fundsrate 0.214
M2 Unemployment 0.160
M2 Inflation 0.147
M2 ALL 0.004
Unemployment Fundsrate 0.000
Unemployment M2 0.224
Unemployment Inflation 0.241
Unemployment ALL 0.000
Inflation Fundsrate 0.251
Inflation M2 0.617
Inflation Unemployment 0.829
Inflation ALL 0.252
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VAR 2: Funds Rate, M2, Output Gap, Inflation
Granger causality test
(1983-2002)
Equation Excluded Prob>chi2
Fundsrate M2 0.267
Fundsrate Output Gap 0.677
Fundsrate Inflation 0.441
Fundsrate ALL 0.461
M2 Fundsrate 0.001
M2 Output Gap 0.034
M2 Inflation 0.007
M2 ALL 0.000
Output Gap Fundsrate 0.015
Output Gap M2 0.441
Output Gap Inflation 0.000
Output Gap ALL 0.002
Inflation Fundsrate 0.541
Inflation M2 0.017
Inflation Output Gap 0.980
Inflation ALL 0.056
Granger causality test
(1960-1979)
Equation Excluded Prob>chi2
Fundsrate M2 0.567
Fundsrate Output Gap 0.021
Fundsrate Inflation 0.028
Fundsrate ALL 0.001
M2 Fundsrate 0.256
M2 Output Gap 0.094
M2 Inflation 0.091
M2 ALL 0.002
Output Gap Fundsrate 0.889
Output Gap M2 0.656
Output Gap Inflation 0.832
Output Gap ALL 0.887
Inflation Fundsrate 0.511
Inflation M2 0.681
Inflation Output Gap 0.083
Inflation ALL 0.027
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VAR 3: Funds Rate, M2, GDP, Inflation
Granger causality test
(1983-2002)
Equation Excluded Prob>chi2
Fundsrate M2 0.572
Fundsrate GDP 0.732
Fundsrate Inflation 0.320
Fundsrate ALL 0.492
M2 Fundsrate 0.026
M2 GDP 0.011
M2 Inflation 0.019
M2 ALL 0.000
GDP Fundsrate 0.385
GDP M2 0.000
GDP Inflation 0.000
GDP ALL 0.000
Inflation Fundsrate 0.826
Inflation M2 0.057
Inflation GDP 0.758
Inflation ALL 0.027
Granger causality test
(1960-1979)
Equation Excluded Prob>chi2
Fundsrate M2 0.704
Fundsrate GDP 0.403
Fundsrate Inflation 0.043
Fundsrate ALL 0.016
M2 Fundsrate 0.394
M2 GDP 0.301
M2 Inflation 0.061
M2 ALL 0.008
GDP Fundsrate 0.246
GDP M2 0.103
GDP Inflation 0.269
GDP ALL 0.025
Inflation Fundsrate 0.084
Inflation M2 0.498
Inflation GDP 0.000
Inflation ALL 0.000
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Appendix C: Forecast Error Variance Decompositions
FEVD Table 1
Funds Rate Exogeneity 
(1960-1979)
Response: Funds Rate Percentage of Forecast Error Variance Explained by
Forecast Horizon Unemployment Inflation Output Gap GDP
6 3.81% 22.00% 14.43% 4.52%
12 11.36% 36.71% 30.04% 20.08%
24 28.20% 34.60% 48.60% 33.11%
36 40.82% 25.78% 53.92% 35.62%
FEVD Table 2
Funds Rate Exogeneity 
(1983-2002)
Response: Funds Rate Percentage of Forecast Error Variance Explained by
Forecast Horizon Unemployment Inflation Output Gap GDP
6 7.84% 0.31% 3.32% 0.12%
12 11.02% 0.51% 5.78% 0.28%
24 7.86% 15.08% 7.55% 1.70%
36 5.77% 34.78% 7.13% 4.57%
FEVD Table 3
Funds Rate as Policy Indicator
(1960-1979)
Impulse: Funds Rate Response Variables
Forecast Horizon Unemployment Inflation Output Gap GDP
6 12.38% 13.84% 10.17% 2.13%
12 4.92% 23.85% 19.14% 14.63%
24 12.63% 29.06% 29.82% 20.88%
36 28.79% 23.23% 29.34% 18.57%
FEVD Table 4
Funds Rate as Policy Indicator
(1983-2002)
Impulse: Funds Rate Response Variables
Forecast Horizon Unemployment Inflation Output Gap GDP
6 28.51% 9.18% 8.10% 11.43%
12 40.75% 24.25% 20.54% 38.18%
24 26.32% 31.37% 14.91% 36.77%
36 16.54% 29.36% 9.35% 30.24%
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Appendix D: Impulse Response Functions
Figure 1
VAR: Funds Rate, M2, Unemployment, Inflation
Impulse: Unemployment; Response: Federal Funds Rate
Figure 2
VAR: Funds Rate, M2, Unemployment, Inflation
Impulse: Inflation; Response: Federal Funds Rate
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Figure 3
VAR: Funds Rate, M2, Unemployment, Inflation
Impulses: Unemployment, Inflation; Response: Federal Funds Rate
Figure 4
VAR: Funds Rate, M2, Output Gap, Inflation
Impulse: Output Gap; Response: Federal Funds Rate
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Figure 5
VAR: Funds Rate, M2, Output Gap, Inflation
Impulses: Output Gap, Inflation; Response: Federal Funds Rate
Figure 6
VAR: Funds Rate, M2, GDP, Inflation
Impulse: GDP; Response: Federal Funds Rate
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Figure 7
VAR: Funds Rate, M2, GDP, Inflation
Impulse: GDP, Inflation; Response: Federal Funds Rate
Figure 8
Combined VAR
Impulse: Unemployment, Inflation, Output Gap, GDP; Response: Federal Funds Rate
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Figure 9
VAR: Funds Rate, M2, Unemployment, Inflation
Impulse: Funds Rate; Response: Unemployment
Figure 10
VAR: Funds Rate, M2, Unemployment, Inflation
Impulse: Funds Rate; Response: Inflation
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Figure 11
VAR: Funds Rate, M2, Unemployment, Inflation
Impulse: Funds Rate; Response: Unemployment, Inflation
Figure 12
VAR: Funds Rate, M2, Output Gap, Inflation
Impulse: Funds Rate; Response: Output Gap
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Figure 13
VAR: Funds Rate, M2, Output Gap, Inflation
Impulse: Funds Rate; Response: Output Gap, Inflation
Figure 14
VAR: Funds Rate, M2, GDP, Inflation
Impulse: Funds Rate; Response: GDP
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Figure 15
VAR: Funds Rate, M2, GDP, Inflation
Impulse: Funds Rate; Response: GDP, Inflation
Figure 16
Combined VAR
Impulse: Funds Rate; Response: Unemployment, Inflation, Output Gap, GDP
